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AFFORDABLE HOUSING: OF INEFFICIENCY, MARKET
DISTORTION, AND GOVERNMENT FAILURE
Michael Diamond *
ABSTRACT
In this essay, I examine the types of costs that are imposed on
society as a whole due to the absence of a sufficient number of decent
housing units that are affordable to the low-income population.
These costs present themselves in relation to health care, education,
employment, productivity, homelessness, and incarceration. Some
of the costs are direct expenditures while others are the result of lost
opportunities.
My hypothesis is that these costs are significant and offer, at the
very least, a substantial offset to the cost of creating and subsidizing
the operation of the necessary number of affordable housing units
that are currently missing. I suggest a series of reasons why, in the
face of this potentially inefficient outcome, the market/society does
not produce the required units.
The essay is conceptual in nature, not empirical. I recognize the
issues associated with the quantification of often opaque costs and
with their causal relationship to the lack of affordable housing. It
is clear, however, that the costs are sizable and the correlations are
strong and therefore, I believe, the hypothesis requires empirical
study.

* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to acknowledge the
generous contributions of Josh Teitelbaum, David Hyman, and Gregg Bloche who, through
several discussions with each, helped me to refine ideas presented here. I would also like to
acknowledge the valuable research assistance of Gabriel Angelo Quevedo and the tremendous editing support of Betsy Kuhn.
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INTRODUCTION
This year 2018 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”).1 While there has been some progress made in reducing discrimination in housing and even some progress in integrating residential communities, there remains a major problem in
the availability of decent, affordable housing for low-income residents,2 a disproportionate number of whom are people of color. The
FHA does not address the shortage of housing, but that shortage
has significant and negative effects on the very population that the
FHA was designed to assist. In one way of thinking, albeit an unconventional one, this shortage might be interpreted as an economic anomaly, a failure of the market and the government to
meet pent up demand when big picture economic indicators suggest the need should be met. The hypothesis of this essay is that
the costs of constructing or renovating and subsidizing a sufficient
number of affordable units will result in significant societal savings in a variety of other areas such as health care, education, employment, and productivity. To the extent these savings approximate or equal the cost of producing and maintaining the necessary
units, on a purely economic basis, the units should be built.3
First, I will point out and attempt to broadly quantify the savings that might result from additional affordable housing. I also
suggest some reasons why society, despite significant cost savings,
fails to provide the necessary housing. These reasons include a collective action problem for developers of affordable housing and a
public choice problem for policy makers. Finally, I attempt to connect these failures to problems that were thought to be addressed
by the FHA.
The discussion in this essay will proceed as follows. In Part I, I
discuss the nature of the affordable housing problem and the bar-

1.
2.

42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2012).
See Pamela Blumenthal et al., The Cost of Affordable Housing: Does It Pencil Out?,
URBAN INST. & NAT’L HOUSING CONF. (July 2016), https://apps.urban.org/features/cost-ofaffordable-housing/ [https://perma.cc/2L4P-RWC3] (stating that for every 100 extremely
low-income households, there are only twenty-nine adequate, affordable, and available
rental units).
3. This hypothesis does not address what many (including myself) would call the moral
obligation of the society to provide decent abodes and living conditions for its most economically vulnerable residents. I will return to this point in Part III of this essay.
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riers to new affordable units entering the market. In Part II, I detail several of the costs that are borne by society due to the lack of
a sufficient number of available affordable units and attempt to
quantify those costs. Part III lays out and explains my theory of
government and market failure in relation to the provision of a sufficient number of decent affordable units. I conclude with some final thoughts on the reasons for the long-standing and growing deficit of such units.
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A. Brief Description of the Problem
There is currently a shortage of millions of units of decent and
affordable housing in the United States.4 The widely promulgated
economic explanation for this shortage is that developers cannot
recoup the costs of developing and maintaining such housing from
the low-income households that would occupy it.5 On the surface,
that explanation seems plausible. Low-income households have, by
definition, a smaller amount of money to devote to housing costs
and the amount is often insufficient to cover the costs of providing
it. However, a more intensive and nuanced examination of the
overall economics of providing a sufficient number of decent, affordable units casts doubt on the validity of this generally accepted
explanation for the lack of such units.
First, it is important to note an important shift in the affordable
housing crisis. It was once the case that the lack of decent, affordable units centered on the number of substandard accommodations
in the market. Today, however, the problem rests more on the actual number of units available, the cost of obtaining a decent unit,
and a household’s ability to bear that cost. That is not to say that
there is no longer a problem of deteriorated or obsolete housing
units; they still exist to an unfortunate degree.6 However, the prob-

4. ANDREW AURAND ET AL., NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., THE GAP: A SHORTAGE
AFFORDABLE HOMES 2 (2017), https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Gap-Report_2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4RGL-56U8] (estimating that in 2017, there was a national shortage of 7.4
million affordable and available rental homes for extremely low-income renters alone).
5. Id. at 9, 13.
6. See, e.g., FREDERICK J. EGGERS & FOUAD MOUMEN, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY:
HOUSING ADEQUACY AND QUALITY AS MEASURED BY THE AHS 2–3 (2013), https://www.cens
OF
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lem of households paying too much of their income for housing, regardless of quality, has become a much greater concern. Disproportionately large expenditures for housing costs leave many households with insufficient funds for other necessities, such as food,
disease prevention and medical care, and educational enrichment.
Of course, such households have precious little, if anything, left
over for extras that much of the population takes for granted: computers and internet access, an occasional restaurant meal, a movie,
or baseball game, for example.
Various studies have shown that in urban settings in the United
States, a significant percentage of households with incomes below
eighty percent of the area median income in their respective locations devote more than thirty percent of household income towards
housing costs.7 Such households are called housing “cost burdened.”8 As one moves lower on the income distribution scale, a
number of households pay more than fifty percent of their income
to “housing” costs.9 These households are known as “severe[ly]
cost-burdened.”10 In an attempt to stretch their already strained
budgets, many cost-burdened households will move to substandard
(albeit cheaper) accommodations or will double up, thereby putting
added stress on buildings (standard or otherwise) and building systems designed for lower density occupancy.11 Engaging in the latter strategy will typically speed up the deterioration of the unit,
us.gov/content/dam/Census/programs-surveys/ahs/publications/HousingAdequacy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4P9S-7FM8] (showing the decrease in the number of poor-quality housing
units in the United States).
7. AURAND ET AL., supra note 4, at 2, 4–5 (“Seventy-one percent of extremely low income renter households are severely cost-burdened, spending more than half of their incomes on rent and utilities. They account for 72.7% of all severely cost-burdened renter
households in the United States. Thirty-two percent of very low income, 8% of low income,
and 2.3% of middle income renter households are severely cost-burdened.”).
8. Id. at 2, 5.
9. Id. at 2.
10. See id. at 5; LIZA GETSINGER ET AL., THE URBAN INST., THE HOUSING
AFFORDABILITY GAP FOR EXTREMELY LOW-INCOME RENTERS IN 2014, at 1 (2017), https:
//www.urban.org/research/publication/housing-affordability-gap-extremely-low-income-ren
ters-2014 [https://perma.cc/TAQ6-C4VL] (discussing the shortage of affordable housing for
extremely low-income renters: “Nationwide, the market provides only 21 adequate, affordable, and available . . . units for every 100 renter households with income at or below 30
percent of the area median income”); ALLISON CHARETTE ET AL., JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS.
STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., PROJECTING TRENDS IN SEVERELY COST-BURDENED RENTERS:
2015–2025, at 4 (2015), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default /files/projecting_trends_
in_severely_cost-burdened_renters_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ W4GC-FQ2N].
11. See Ahmad Abu-Khalaf, State of the Nation’s Housing 2017 Report Highlights Continued Affordability Challenges, Increased Segregation by Income, ENTERPRISE (June 16,
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which often leads to a formerly standard unit becoming a distressed one. In addition to, and more importantly than, the stress
placed on the buildings, the overcrowding places adds stress on the
residents, which has its own implications, to be discussed below.
These substandard and overcrowded units are frequently concentrated in communities with a significant percentage of low-income
households, often communities of color.12
An additional and extreme effect of the increased cost of housing
is homelessness. Homelessness today comprises a wide demographic: people with physical or emotional disabilities, people with
substance abuse problems, veterans, families with children, and
unaccompanied youth. While the number of people who have experienced homelessness in a year is disputed, there is little disagreement that the range begins at least in the mid-hundreds of thousands and rises to somewhat more than one million.13
Over the decades, particularly after the Great Depression, governments on the federal, state, and local level have attempted to
provide some relief for low-income people in their search for ade-

2017), https://www.enterprisecommunity.org/blog/2017/06/state-nations-housing-2017-rep
ort-highlights-continued-affordability-challenges
[https://perma.cc/ACG2-8ZTD];
ENTERPRISE CMTY. PARTNERS, INC., IMPACT OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING ON FAMILIES AND
COMMUNITIES: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE BASE 3 (2014), https://homeforallsmc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/Impact-of-Affordable-Housing-on-Families-and-Communities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VU29-DLDH] (“Across the U.S., 10.9 million low-income renter households
and 7.5 million low-income homeowner households are severely cost burdened—paying
more than 50 percent of their income on housing costs. Another estimated 610,000 people
(or 400,000 households) were homeless in 2013. This may underestimate the scale of the
crisis because the industry lacks complete data on all forms of housing instability—households that miss rent payments, move involuntarily or double-up because they cannot afford
to live on their own.”).
12. See ISAAC SHAPIRO ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, BASIC FACTS ON
CONCENTRATED POVERTY 3 (2015), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-315hous2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6H62-6SUB]. “Concentrated poverty is overwhelmingly an
urban and suburban phenomenon: 90 percent of extreme-poverty tracts are in metropolitan
areas.” Id. at 2 (“The picture is worse for minorities than for whites: the concentrated poverty rate is 25.2 percent among African Americans and 17.4 percent among Hispanics, compared to 7.5 percent for whites . . . . Because these figures reflect the share of poor individuals living in areas of concentrated poverty, this disparity cannot be attributed to the fact
that African American and Hispanic households are more likely to be poor. That is, minorities are more likely to be poor, and poor minorities are also more likely to live in extremepoverty neighborhoods.”).
13. See E.W., How Many Homeless People Are There in America?, ECONOMIST (Feb. 22
2016), https://www.economist.com/democracy-in-america/2016/02/22/how-many-homelesspeople-are-there-in-america [https://perma.cc/Z325-7GRS].
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quate affordable housing. Programs such as Public Housing (originally providing government-owned, low-rent housing),14 and programs involving tax incentives,15 cash subsidies,16 mortgage interest rate subsidies,17 and zoning changes18 have been implemented
to increase the number of units available to the poor and to subsidize the cost of units to low-income residents. While these programs did provide some relief, in recent decades, many of these
programs have been frozen at funding levels inadequate to meet
the need or have had their funding reduced or eliminated.19 At the
same time, affordable units have been leaving the market at far
more rapid rates than they enter the market.20 These losses have
resulted from many causes. In the 1950s and 1960s, for example,

14. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2012).
15. See I.R.C. § 42 (2012) (providing tax credits for qualified low-income housing).
16. The Housing Choice Voucher Program, originally known as the Section 8 program,
provided direct cash payments to landlords to supplement the rent payments of eligible tenants. Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & DEV., https://www.
hud.gov/topics/housing_choice_voucher_program_section_8 [https://perma.cc/XRW6-AFSB]
(last visited Feb. 1, 2019). The tenant paid thirty percent of household income as rent and
the subsidy made up the difference up to a cap of the “fair market rent.” Id. Section 8 was
originally added to the National Housing Act of 1937 in 1974. Housing Choice Voucher Program, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 201(8), 88 Stat. 633, 662-66 (1974) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1437f (2012 & Supp. V 2018)).
17. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 236, 82 Stat.
476, 498 (1968) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (2012 & Supp. V 2018)) (creating the Section
236 program); National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1715l (2012) (creating Below Market Interest Rate Program and providing subsidized mortgage rates to private developers constructing new or substantially renovated existing units for multifamily rental housing).
18. See, e.g., D.C. CODE §§ 6-1041.01–.09 (2018).
19. These restrictions have come as a result of budget constraints and political choices.
See, e.g., JONATHAN HARRIS & STACY NAKINTU, NAT’L ASS’N CTYS., BUILDING HOMES:
COUNTY FUNDING FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING 3, 9 (2018), https://www.naco.org/featured-re
sources/building-homes-county-funding-affordable-housing#after-related [https://perma.cc
/N7LV-M5C7] (discussing innovations counties must devise to meet reduced federal funding
of affordable housing). For a chart showing the annual decline in federal funding for affordable housing between 2011 and 2016, see Declining Federal Housing Funding,
INCLUSIONARY HOUSING (Apr. 12, 2016), https://inclusionaryhousing.org/inclusionary-hous
ing-explained/what-problems-does-iz-address/declining-federal-housing-funding/ [https://
perma.cc/RWH2-NG4V].
20. What Is Preservation?, NAT’L HOUSING TR., https://www.nationalhousingtrust.org/
what-preservation [https://perma.cc/5VEA-T59Y] (last visited Feb. 1, 2019).
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many units were lost to highway construction21 and urban renewal.22 In the 1970s, urban unrest23 and the beginnings of gentrification spurred additional waves of losses.24 The 1980s and 1990s
saw the acceleration of housing prices, rents, and gentrification.25
In addition, throughout these decades, major public works were
developed, often in formerly low-cost neighborhoods,26 as well as
the conversion of many existing housing structures to other uses.
At the same time, the population, and especially the number of
households, was growing, thereby exacerbating the problem.

21. Alexander von Hoffman, Enter the Housing Industry Stage Right: A Working Paper
on the History of Housing Policy 45 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Harvard Univ., Working
Paper No. 08-1, 2008), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/w08-1_von_hoffman.
pdf [https://perma.cc/F6RT-P9P2]. President Eisenhower pushed for a national highway
system that was put in place through the passage of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956,
Pub. L. No. 84-627, 70 Stat. 374 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 23 and 26
U.S.C.); Press Release, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Press Release to Congress (Feb.
22, 1955).
22. The Urban Redevelopment Program (the forerunner to Urban Renewal) was created
in the Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413, 414 (amended by 42 U.S.C. §
5316 (2012)). For an interesting discussion of the Highway and Urban Renewal programs,
see KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED
STATES 190–218 (1985).
23. See, e.g., Marcus Casey & Bradley Hardy, 50 Years After the Kerner Commission
Report, the Nation Is Still Grappling with Many of the Same Issues, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept.
25, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/09/25/50-years-after-the-kernercommission-report-the-nation-is-still-grappling-with-many-of-the-same-issues/ [https://per
ma.cc/KN8K-Z7QF].
24. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., DISPLACEMENT OF LOWER-INCOME
FAMILIES IN URBAN AREAS REPORT 3 (2018), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default
/files/pdf/DisplacementReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/72XE-XDCH] (“Federal and local spending on dog parks and bike shares, among other amenities, during the 1990s is likely to have
influenced the urbanization of the young, college-educated demographic today. One particular redevelopment initiative, HUD’s Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE
VI), which began in 1992, may have influenced recent trends in changing communities.
HOPE VI demolished 96,200 units of severely distressed public housing throughout the nation, with the goal of revitalizing public housing projects and deconcentrating poverty.”).
25. Id. (“A study on the impact of HOPE VI found that many severely distressed public
housing projects were replaced with high-quality, lower-density, mixed-income housing that
contributed to the revitalization of entire inner-city communities, along with improving conditions for surrounding neighborhoods. Several HOPE VI developments were successful in
attracting a mix of market-rate, affordable, and low-income tenants. In all sites, most residents in new developments reported being satisfied with their units and neighborhoods.
Revitalization efforts also led to new community amenities such as police substations, community centers, and job training centers.”).
26. Id.
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B. Barriers to Entry of New Affordable Units
Despite the growing need for affordable units, very few new or
restored units enter the market due to the many barriers to such
entry. The obvious economic barrier is that there is typically insufficient return to developers to justify the investment. But there are
also legal, political, and social barriers, many of which are heavily
intertwined.
Jurisdictions often zone against affordable housing by requiring
large lot sizes and low densities. They may have antiquated building codes, impose high property tax rates, or have other regulatory
restrictions to new residential construction.27 Socially, there has
been significant community resistance to building affordable housing, where it otherwise might be legally permissible, from more affluent residents of those communities. Even in areas where there
is neither legal impediment nor social resistance, there has been a
political reluctance, or inability, to provide the funds needed for
construction or renovation of units and the subsidies needed to allow low-income households to afford them. The following parts
briefly explore some of these barriers.
1. Traditional Economic Barriers
The most obvious barrier to the creation of additional affordable
housing is that potential developers of such housing do not see a
pathway to a return that justifies their risk. The costs of developing any housing are significant. Such costs are divided into several
discrete categories. There are development costs, planning costs,
the cost of land, construction costs, and various fees, taxes, and
miscellaneous costs. These costs are typically met by the infusion
of some risk capital from the developer with the balance coming
from various loans.
Once a development is complete, the project must be operated.
Hence, there are operating costs, such as utilities, maintenance,
salaries, taxes, and insurance. One must add to this the financing
costs involved in the repayment of the development loans, funds

27. See, e.g., NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 716–19 (N.J. 1975) (discussing a city ordinance that required large residential lot sizes and prevented lower income
individuals from obtaining affordable housing in the city).
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allocated to reserves, and owner profit. These costs ultimately
must be met by the income of the project, which overwhelmingly
come from rent. Low-income residents have, by definition, a capped
ability to bear such costs. This fact severely limits the profit potential for a property owner. Moreover, if a renter devotes an excessive
amount of income to housing costs, the renter has a greater risk of
default in paying rent should any unanticipated expense arise.
Thus, developer and property owners face significant obstacles in
making a success of a low-income development. When these obstacles are juxtaposed against the opportunity costs of other potential
investments by the developer, the problem comes into clear focus.
In the absence of significant subsidies, developers generally lack
economic incentive to construct and operate affordable housing.
Of course, there are locations in which the costs of development
might be reduced by the surrounding economic conditions. In areas
where there is a surplus of unused (or underused) land, the cost of
acquiring property may be significantly reduced. Areas hard-hit by
the mortgage foreclosure crisis come to mind as an example of this
phenomenon. Similarly, subsidies provided by government in the
form of the donation of public land or through various cash subsidies can reduce financing costs or bolster tenants’ ability to pay a
market required rent.28 However, both land and subsidies are finite resources (in today’s world) that limit the ability of governments to provide assistance.
Finally, there is the “trickle-down” theory (or supply side economics) popularized during the administration of President
Ronald Reagan.29 He used it to support his plan to lower taxes on
high marginal bracket tax payers which he argued would produce
economic benefits to those with lower incomes.30 When applied to
housing, the theory posits that construction of more high-cost housing units will ultimately benefit the low-income population.31 The
trickle-down theory suggests that as more high-cost units are built,
creating a surplus of such units, high-income residents will move
28. See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text (discussing various subsidies the government provides to reduce costs to the landlord and increase the availability of affordable
housing).
29. Reaganomics, U.S. HIST., http://www.ushistory.org/us/59b.asp [https://perma.cc/L4
ZA-BS6B] (last visited Feb. 1, 2019).
30. Id.
31. See James A. Kushner, The Reagan Urban Policy: Centrifugal Force in the Empire,
2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 209, 239 (1982).
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into these newer, more modern units causing a surplus of vacancies in the previously occupied units which will be filled by the next
lower income level.32 This shift in occupancy will create a surplus
of vacancies in units at this level, and so on down the scale. Theoretically, the surplus of units in any price range should depress the
cost of such units thereby making better units available at lower
cost to low-income households.
The trickle-down theory, used during the Reagan administration
to justify tax relief for the wealthy, was heavily criticized, to the
extent that then-Presidential hopeful George H.W. Bush called it
“voodoo economics.”33 In the housing context, the scholarly and
popular literature has critiqued the theory.34 My own concerns
with the theory derive from the problem of pent-up demand in
highly desirable locales. If many higher-income potential residents
desire to live in a location with a constricted supply of housing, the
increase in the supply will be eliminated, not necessarily by existing residents moving up to occupy the new units, but by new residents moving into the area. They thereby create additional competition for the new units which will push housing costs even higher.
Some of those moves will open up vacant units in the mover’s original location, but some will not. New households created by people
leaving family homes or shared households where other residents
remain in place will absorb some of the surplus. Even for the units
vacated by the move, the question of spatial mismatch between the
units and potential residents in each subsequent lower-income
strata may disrupt the movement of units to progressively lower
income residents.

32. Anthony Downs, Are Subsidies the Best Answer for Housing Low and Moderate Income Households?, 4 URB. LAW. 405, 409–10 (1972).
33. See Paul Wiseman, Trickle-Down Economics Gets New Life as Republicans Push
Tax-Cut Plan, USA TODAY (Nov. 19, 2017, 11:07 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/mo
ney/2017/11/19/trickle-down-economics-gets-new-life-republicans-push-tax-cut-plan/87870
2001/ [https://perma.cc/SG67-KCUS] (“Voodoo economics was the derisive term George H.W.
Bush applied to it in his failed 1980 bid for the Republican presidential nomination against
Ronald Reagan, a supply-side enthusiast.”).
34. ERA DABLA-NORRIS, INT’L MONETARY FUND, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
INCOME INEQUALITY: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 7–8, 30–32 (2015), https://www.imf.org/extern
al/pubs/ft/sdn/2015/sdn1513.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZEW7-84T5].
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2. Legal Barriers
Legal barriers to the creation of additional housing take several
forms, but for the most part, they can be summed up with the
catchall phrase “regulatory barriers.” Many of these are familiar.
For example, some jurisdictions, particularly in the suburbs, impose large minimum lot size requirements that have the effect of
keeping density low and land costs high.35 These are often accompanied by minimum set-back requirements that restrict the
amount of land that can be used for habitation and have similar
effects.36 Additional restrictions include environmental regulations, impact fees, building codes, zoning, parking space requirements, labor requirements, and, in relation to many of these restrictions, bureaucratic delay. All of these, to some extent, impede
development of housing by restricting land available for residential
use and by adding to the cost of what is constructed.
While these regulatory barriers often raise the cost of housing,
many of them also benefit society—most people would choose to
impose these restrictions despite the cost. In such cases, the imposition on the cost of housing is offset by increases in other social
utilities, in areas such as health, safety, or environmental benefits.
For example, almost everyone would agree that requiring that
builders to use fire retardant materials creates a social benefit that
more than offsets the added cost of using such materials. Other
barriers, such as minimum lot size, may involve little more than
deadweight losses that increase housing cost without providing offsetting social benefit. The problem, of course, is that outside of the
obvious examples, “[d]istinguishing between unnecessary regulatory barriers that should be removed and necessary or useful regulation that should be preserved is an extraordinarily difficult
task.”37
This part refers primarily to the unnecessary regulatory burdens. However, even when offsetting social benefits exist, the
choice between imposing the cost to achieve the benefit and not
doing so is not neutral. It is the product of a calculus that reflects
35.
36.

See id.
Michael H. Schill, Regulations and Housing Development: What We Know, 8
CITYSCAPE, no. 1, 2005, at 5, 7.
37. Id. at 6–7, 10–11.
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the social, economic, and political preferences of policy setters and
their constituents.38
Many commentators have suggested the significant role that local regulation plays in affecting both the supply and the cost of
housing. While other factors, such as topography, the degree of unionization of construction workers, and its concomitant effect on
wage rates influence the supply of housing and its price, Gyourko
and Molloy suggest that “regulation appears to be the single most
important influence on the supply of homes.”39
In a similar vein, the Spring 2018 edition of the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) Evidence Matters, points out that:
Although affordability challenges in some areas of the country result
primarily from low incomes and poverty, in other areas, particularly
those with strong job and population growth, a constrained housing
supply generates affordability challenges. In the latter locations, regulatory barriers such as density limitations, height restrictions, parking requirements, lengthy permitting and approval processes, and
“not in my backyard” (NIMBY) opposition are the primary reasons for
housing supply restrictions and increased housing costs.40

Supply, of course, is a major determinant of price, which affects
affordability. But the price of housing has a further, less articulated, external effect. Theory suggests that the amenities associated with housing (which include not only desirable features that
have been built into the home but also external elements of open
space, unobstructed and aesthetically pleasing views, and the accessibility of nearby goods, services, and cultural accoutrements)
result in an economic sorting of residents which, in turn, leads to

38. See infra Part I.B.3.b. This discussion harkens back to the vast literature on the
nature and use of power in society, a topic that I do not cover in depth in this essay but to
which I have devoted attention in a series of earlier writings. For the most recent of these,
see Michael Diamond, The Transposition of Power: Law, Lawyers, and Social Movements,
24 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 319 (2017).
39. See Joseph Gyourko & Raven Molloy, Regulation and Housing Supply (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20536, 2014), https://nber.org/papers/w20536.pdf
[https://perma.cc/36NK-MPEC].
40. See Regina C. Gray, Regulatory Barriers and Affordable Housing: Problems and
Solutions, EVIDENCE MATTERS (U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., D.C.), Spring 2018, at
2–3, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/EM-Newsletter-spring-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CPH4-ACJ5].
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economic and, often, racial segregation.41 As Michael Schill points
out:
[O]ne is immediately drawn to the concept of economic efficiency. To
the extent that the social costs of a regulation exceed its social benefits, it would seem . . . [to be] excessive and unnecessary. A more difficult question surrounds those regulations that are efficient but generate unsatisfactory distributional results. For example, some
regulations may generate a surplus of benefits over costs, but the benefits will primarily inure to higher income families and the costs to
low- and moderate-income families.42

While one might quibble with the calculation of costs and benefits of any particular regulation, Schill is undoubtedly correct in
pointing out distributional consequences of regulations that restrict the development of housing and, thereby, raise the price of
existing units and increase the cost of producing new units.43 This
effect may, in fact, have been the motivating factor for the adoption
of the regulation in the first place. As Schill himself points out,
“[t]he question of whether a regulation constitutes a barrier that
needs to be removed may sometimes depend on how much housing
is valued compared to other social objectives.”44
3. Political Barriers
This brings us to the question of political barriers. Why, one
might ask, would local jurisdictions impose barriers to the creation
of additional housing? To the extent that restrictive regulations do
not have an offsetting social benefit, they impose deadweight loss
and distort the market. That is to say that but for the restricting
regulation, developers would create more housing in the jurisdiction. A number of theories have been suggested for why such regulations exist.

41. See Schill, supra note 36, at 7 (“Increased demand induced by the greater amenities
required by the laws may generate price increases[;] . . . many of these same regulations can
be used . . . to promote social or racial homogeneity.”).
42. Id.
43. See id. at 9.
44. Id. at 8.
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a. Nimbyism
Perhaps the most accessible theory is the not in my backyard
(“NIMBY”) syndrome. This phenomenon takes two distinct but related forms. The first, and more visible, form involves organized
opposition to an unwanted project proposed to be placed in or adjacent to one’s neighborhood.45 This could range from opposing a
nuclear energy plant being built nearby, to opposing a homeless
shelter being placed in the neighborhood, to opposing affordable
housing being built nearby.
The second, and less visible, form involves local residents voting
for elected officials who will impose development-restricting regulations for the area.46 Here, the effect of the opposition is widespread. It does not pertain to a particular unwanted development
but to essentially all development. What is the rationale for such a
position? The most common answer is that voters, particularly local homeowners, are voting to protect the value of their investment. This is true even if a potential development is not otherwise
objectionable to the homeowner.47 Merely by increasing the supply
of housing, a downward pressure would normally be imposed on
the value of existing homes. “Land use rules are largely determined, directly or indirectly, by existing homeowners desiring to
keep their property values high, and the potential beneficiaries of
looser restrictions do not (yet) live or vote in those jurisdictions.”48
For the individual homeowner, this opposition, which, again I
am assuming creates deadweight loss for the society, may make
economic sense. As a group, homeowners reap essentially all of the
benefit of the restrictive policies, most directly through higher values for their homes. They bear, however, only a small percentage

45. See generally Michael Dear, Understanding and Overcoming the NIMBY Syndrome,
58 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 288, 290 (1992).
46. Id; see Regina C. Gray, Exploring the Current State of Knowledge on the Impact of
Regulations on Housing Supply, EVIDENCE MATTERS (U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
D.C.), Spring 2018, at 11, 12, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/EMNewsletter-spring-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQT4-XJ8Z].
47. See Roger K. Lewis, Not in Your Back Yard? Think Twice Before You Demonize All
Change, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/not-in-y
our-back-yard-think-twice-before-you-demonize-all-change/2016/11/17/e6e3fa0e-a5d0-11e6
-8042-f4d111c862d1_story.html [https://perma.cc/MA65-ULS6].
48. See Gray, supra note 40, at 6.
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of the total societal cost imposed due to the absence of such housing.49
There is a second economic benefit that homeowners derive from
development restrictions. The local costs associated with development—including congestion, pollution, providing new infrastructure—and, to the extent potential development brings in families
with children or lower-income families, there are also added costs
for schools and perhaps for a greater degree of social services. Yet
older, wealthier homeowners have little need or desire for these
effects. Thus development would impose on preexisting homeowners a share of costs for which they would receive a much smaller
share of the benefit.
b. Public Choice
The NIMBY syndrome purports to explain why residents of a
jurisdiction might oppose certain development projects or policies.50 It does not explain why local legislators vote against such
projects or policies. While this will be discussed in more depth in
Part III, it would be useful to have a short discussion of public
choice theory here. The essence of the public choice concept involves the application of economic theory to political actors.51 It assumes that such actors are rational and make decisions that enhance their own preferences.52 For many political actors in elected
office, the primary goal is to remain in office. The decisions they
make and actions they take are designed to further that goal even
if the decisions or actions undermine the preferences they might

49. See, e.g., Richard Florida, Anatomy of a NIMBY, CITYLAB (Feb. 23, 2017), https://
www.citylab.com/equity/2017/02/california-land-use-housing-affordability/517320/ [https:/
/perma.cc/KE8M-ZHHN] (“A 2015 study estimated that land use restrictions costs the
United States upwards of $1.5 trillion in lost productivity.”). In 2016, President Obama
called for comprehensive reform of zoning and land use restrictions to work against high
economic rents, build more affordable housing, and stimulate the economy. CHAIR OF THE
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 44, 87–89 (2016). Of
course, the loss in overall productivity is merely one of the costs that society bears due to
the inadequate supply of decent, affordable housing.
50. Dear, supra note 45, at 288.
51. James M. Buchanan, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice
Theory and Its Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE–II, at 11, 13
(James M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds., The Univ. of Mich. Press 1984).
52. Id.
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pursue in a private capacity.53 James Buchanan, one of the progenitors of public choice theory, has said:
Public choice theory has been the avenue through which a romantic
and illusory set of notions about the workings of governments and the
behavior of persons who govern has been replaced by a set of notions
that embody more skepticism about what governments can do and
what governors will do, notions that are surely more consistent with
the political reality that we may all observe about us.54

Assume, as Buchanan does, channeling economist Duncan Black
and Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow, that a group of electors deciding among an array of possible choices cannot create a firm majority position ordering such choices. To the extent that the decision
is taken in a town hall setting, electors are likely to make compromises in line with some calculus involving their own preference orders. If, however, the choices are made by a representative assembly elected by the electors, a different calculus arises.
Even if we take only the single step from town-meeting democracy
to representative democracy, we must introduce the possible divergence between the interests of the representative or agent who is
elected or appointed to act for the group and the interests of the group
members themselves.
It is at this point that electoral competition, as an institution, plays
a role that has some similarities with that played by market competition in the economy.55

If the political arena is merely a subset of the market, and if
political actors are merely self-interested participants, the concept
of the public good, as indeterminate as it generally is, becomes even
more amorphous. In the next part, I discuss the costs that a society
imposes on itself when it fails to provide a sufficient number of decent, affordable housing units for lower-income households.
II. SOCIETAL COSTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE ABSENCE OF
AFFORDABLE HOUSING
The part of this story that describes the lack of decent, affordable
housing units for low-income households is not new. It has been

53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 18.
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written about by many commentators, including myself, from a variety of perspectives. There is, however, another part of the story
that has not been fully examined and is not widely considered.
That involves the costs imposed on society by the deficit of affordable units. It is the examination of these costs that I take up here.
The costs imposed by a shortage of affordable units fall on both
the households seeking such units and on the society that fails to
provide them. The costs on households has been well documented
and include: excessive rent burdens on households to secure such
housing; doubling up in and overcrowding such units to be able to
afford them; negative health effects due to housing conditions and
cost burdens; lack of funds, due in part to excessive spending on
rent, for health and wellness care; educational deficiencies for children due to physical illness, overcrowding, and stress; environmental issues such as noise, lack of privacy, lead paint, and mold; and
losses in job productivity.56
What is less widely understood is the cost that the lack of units
imposes on society as a whole. While the public generally recognizes some of the cost creating factors, such as those associated
with homelessness or emergency room visits, many other costs are
not well understood by the public or by policy makers. These include costs are associated with health care, educational achievement, employment and productivity, and opportunity losses.
Several obstacles impede the general understanding of the societal costs imposed by an inadequate supply of affordable housing.
One obstacle is the fact that each area of cost has been studied
largely in a silo, detached from studies of other relevant cost areas.
Another confounding factor in constructing a clear picture of the
societal burden is that while many researchers recognize the existence of societal costs, they have not, in many cases, been able definitively to quantify them. Moreover, while there is a clear correlation between various social costs and the absence of a sufficient
number of affordable units, researchers have not been able to isolate a direct causal connection between the absence of units and
many of the costs imposed on society.

56. Latisha Johnson, Who’s Hit Hardest by the Affordable Housing Shortage?, GREATER
GREATER WASH. (Jan. 10, 2019), https://ggwash.org/view/70436/the-affordable-housing-shor
tage-explained [https://perma.cc/ZY9P-X7HK].
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For purposes of this essay, the absence of precise quantification
and of a firm causal relationship between the lack of affordable
housing units and many of the social costs are not disqualifying.
The argument I make here is conceptual rather than quantitative.
While more research is needed on both quantification and causality, it is quite clear that some significant societal cost could be alleviated with the provision of decent affordable units. My goal is to
point out some of the areas of cost and to emphasize the connection
between these apparently disparate areas. When these costs are
aggregated, they are likely to be substantial and to serve at least
as a major offset to the cost of creating and subsidizing on an ongoing basis enough units of affordable housing to close the housing
gap. If this economic argument survives empirical analysis, it will
only enhance what I consider to be a moral obligation of society to
provide for those the market has left behind.
A. Homelessness
Of the various costs I will discuss, those associated with homelessness are among the most visible and, to some extent, the most
easily tied to a causal situation. I say “to some extent” because
many of the costs associated with homelessness are just as hidden
as are some of the others I will discuss in this part. The ones that
are most accessible include the cost of providing shelters, policing
and incarceration, and health care, especially emergency room visits.57 For example, Philip Mangano, the policy chief of President
George W. Bush’s homelessness program, indicated that “the cost
of keeping people on the street added up to between $35,000 and
$150,000 per person per year.”58 He went on to indicate that the
cost of keeping formerly homeless people housed under the housing-first programs ranged between $13,000 and $25,000 per person

57. See Molly Moorhead, HUD Secretary Says a Homeless Person Costs Taxpayers
$40,000 a Year, POLITIFACT (Mar. 12, 2012, 3:59 PM), https://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/statements/2012/mar/12/shaun-donovan/hud-secretary-says-homeless-person-coststaxpayers/ [https://perma.cc/9JR4-ZQXB] (“The thing we finally figured out is that it’s actually, not only better for people, but cheaper to solve homelessness than it is to put a bandaid on it . . . Because, at the end of the day, it costs, between shelters and emergency rooms
and jails, it costs about $40,000 a year for a homeless person to be on the streets.”). The
story was reporting on a March 5, 2012, interview with HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan on
“The Daily Show.” Id. For a narrative presentation of a bit of one man’s life on the streets,
see Malcom Gladwell, Million Dollar Murray, NEW YORKER, Feb. 23, 2006, at 96, 92.
58. Moorhead, supra note 57.
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per year.59 With an estimate of more than one-half million people
being homeless as of January 2017,60 even at the low end of the
cost range proposed by Shaun Donovan or Philip Mangano, the
costs of sheltering, incarcerating, and policing the homeless are in
excess of $17.5 billion per year.61 These costs are borne by society
as a whole with the brunt of the costs placed on state and local
governments and their respective taxpayers. While there are some
disputes concerning the savings associated with the use of Housing
First programs, there is widespread agreement that there are significant savings.62
I stated that there were other, less accessible costs associated
with homelessness. Some of these costs are connected to more or
less objective, albeit hard to measure, manifestations. Consider the
financial and environmental costs concerning the presence of trash
and human waste in local encampments and public areas, and
quality of life costs to those experiencing homelessness and to other
residents of areas where homelessness is prevalent (such as, for
example, reduced accessibility to public space). Consider also costs
that are much harder to see, not to mention quantify. These involve
human suffering, lost productivity from those who experience
59. Id. The Housing First program, which provides housing to homeless individuals and
families without requiring that they first engage in treatment programs for substance abuse
or mental health problems, began as a series of experimental programs in several states
and local jurisdictions. The federal government entered the experimental arena when Congress in 2008 appropriated $25 million for McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Grants to
aid rapid rehousing. Rapid Re-Housing: A History and Core Components, NAT’L ALL. END
HOMELESSNESS (Apr. 22, 2014), https://endhomelessness.org/resource/rapid-re-housing-ahistory-and-core-components/ [https://perma.cc/BCF4-2QDC].
60. See State of Homelessness, NAT’L ALL. END HOMELESSNESS, https://endhomeless
ness.org/homelessness-in-america/homelessness-statistics/state-of-homelessness-report/
[https://perma.cc/VPQ6-TJUC] (last visited Feb. 1, 2019).
61. Moorhead, supra note 57. The $17.5 billion is the total cost of providing service for
homeless persons $35,000 per person per year cost estimate for “sheltering, incarcerating,
and policing” homeless individuals multiplied by the approximately 500,000 homeless individuals on any given night.
62. See, e.g., Angela Ly & Eric Latimer, Housing First Impact on Costs and Associated
Cost Offsets: A Review of the Literature, 60 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 475, 475–76, 482, 485–86
(2015) (“While our review casts doubt on whether [Housing First] programs can be expected
to pay for themselves, the certainty of significant cost offsets, combined with their benefits
for participants, means that they represent a more efficient allocation of resources than
traditional services.”); see also Mary E. Larimer et al., Health Care and Public Service Use
and Losts Before and After Provision of Housing for Chronically Homeless Persons with Severe Alcohol Problems, 301 JAMA 1349, 1349, 1355–56 (Apr. 1, 2009) (“The provision of
housing reduces hospital visits, admissions, and duration of hospital stays among homeless
individuals, and overall public system spending is reduced by nearly as much as is spent on
housing.”).
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homelessness, and educational losses for homeless children that
often translate into long-term losses to society from what the effected children might otherwise have achieved.
B. General Health
For many years, I have shared my fundamental belief that housing
is a critical vaccine that can pave the way to long-term health and
well-being.63
[R]eactive medical treatments—i.e., those that treat the symptoms
rather than the root causes—are both expensive and ineffective.64

Homelessness is not the only source of increased health risks
among people with low incomes. Even for those who have housing,
the risks for low-income households are significantly higher than
for higher income households. These increased risks come primarily from three major sources. The first of these derives from residing in substandard units with a concomitant increased susceptibility to illness and injury. The second derives from low-income
households spending too high a percentage of their income on housing, thus leaving too little of their income available for health related issues such as wellness activities, treatment for illness or injury, prescription or over the counter medication, and nutrition,
not to mention recreational activities. As a corollary (and theoretical antidote) to the high level of spending, many families doubleup
in units in order to be able to afford them, thus creating overcrowded conditions with its own set of dangers. While remaining
in a crowded unit presents risks to residents, making frequent
moves into new units brings risks as well.65 The third source of
health-related effects derives from the first two: due to substandard or overly expensive units, low-income households often suffer
from housing insecurity in which the household moves several
times within a relatively short period. In the following parts, I will
63. Megan T. Sandel, Housing Is a Critical Vaccine, ENTERPRISE (Feb. 25, 2016), https:
//www.enterprisecommunity.org/2016/02/housing-critical-vaccine [https://perma.cc/CC43S8EW].
64. MACARTHUR FOUND., HOW HOUSING MATTERS 6 (2016), https://www.macfound.
org/media/files/How_Housing_Matters_in_Chicago_Conference_White_Paper1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5VHA-V4ZR].
65. See Virginia A. Rauh et al., Housing and Health: Intersection of Poverty and Environmental Exposures, 1136 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 276, 277 (2008) (“Residential stability
has been identified as one of the most important predictors of community health—even more
important than standard sociological variables, such as poverty and racial composition.”).
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discuss some of the health related risks associated with each of
these sources and point out how much of the costs associated with
these risks is externalized to the society in general.
1. Substandard Units
“A substantial body of literature demonstrates that poor housing
can contribute to infectious disease transmission, injuries, asthma
symptoms, lead poisoning, and mental health problems . . . .”66
As I have mentioned, living in substandard housing increases the
risk of injury and illness. Such units are likely to include several
risk enhancing features and to lack several risk reducing ones67
due to shoddy construction, seriously deferred maintenance, or obsolescence. The resulting structural defects manifest themselves in
ways that impact health.
The range of potential hazards include (among others), damp, mould,
excess cold or heat, danger of fire, carbon monoxide, poor lighting,
danger of falls, noise overcrowding and inadequate space, and structural integrity of the building. The type of risks to health stemming
from these hazards include respiratory and asthmatic conditions, infections and other chest conditions, coronary disease and strokes, as
well as fractures, burns, and a range of psychological and mental
health conditions that can be exacerbated by poor conditions.68

Some of these defects, those contributing to diseases such as
asthma and mold related respiratory issues, allergies, and lead

66. See Susan C. Saegert et al., Healthy Housing: A Structural Review of Published
Evaluations of US Interventions to Improve Health by Modifying Housing in the United
States, 1990–2001, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1471, 1471 (2003).
67. For example, take the problem of a unit with inadequate heating. If a central heating system is malfunctioning, residents may attempt to heat a unit by using an oven or
space heater. Both of these responses involve substantial danger. The use of ovens or space
heaters create additional utility expense on an already strapped budget, further reducing
funds available for other essential uses. On a more direct level, ovens used as heating devices increase the risk of burns, especially for children, and, if the oven is gas fueled, of gas
related accidents. The use of electric space heaters also risks overloading the unit’s electrical
system causing risk of electrical fires. Similarly, such units may lack smoke detectors, have
exposed wires, or have leaking roofs, all of which may contribute to disease or accidental
injury.
68. See DANNY FRIEDMAN, ECOTEC, SOCIAL IMPACT OF POOR HOUSING 14 (2010),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.476.9406&rep=rep1&type=pdf
[https://perma.cc/5N83-J75D].
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paint poisoning are rather easily corrected.69 The illnesses and accidents add to the burdens on the health care system. Much of the
costs of such illnesses and injuries falls on the public through Medicare, Medicaid, and emergency room visits. Some portion of the
cost falls on the low-income victim of the injury or illness who first
suffers the incident and then may not seek health care due to the
expense.70 Yet another portion of the costs falls on society when
untreated ailments become more severe, leading to ultimately
greater costs. In the aggregate, the societal costs associated with
poor housing are very high. A 2010 study in the United Kingdom
estimated these costs at nearly £2.5 billion.71 There is also the more
indirect cost to society due to the drop in productivity of workers
who are fully or partially incapacitated by the ailment. This point
will be further discussed in Part D.
2. Cost Burden
A significant percentage of low-income households devote too
large a portion of their incomes to housing costs.72 In some of these
situations, the household makes a conscious choice to pay more in
order to secure a better unit, neighborhood, or school. In other circumstances, the decision is merely the reflection of the costs associated with the local housing market, regardless of quality or
neighborhood. In either case, the excess amounts paid for rent deprives the household of some benefit that might otherwise have
been obtained.73
69. For example, one might put smoke or carbon monoxide detectors in units, repair
broken windows or light fixtures, or repair or replace handrails.
70. See AURAND ET AL., supra note 4, at 6.
71. FRIEDMAN, supra note 68, at 15. The cost assessment produced by this study is only
illustrative of the magnitude of the cost in the United States. See Cesar Aquino, Brief Comparison-UK Healthcare System vs. U.S. Healthcare System, HEALTHCAREADMINISTRATION.
COM, http://www.healthcareadministration.com/brief-comparison-uk-healthcare-system-vsu-s-healthcare-system [https://perma.cc/CT8X-A3NV] (last visited Feb. 1, 2019). The United
Kingdom, with a much smaller population, also functions with a nationalized health care
system that is much more highly regulated than the private system in the United States.
See Josh Chang et al., The UK Health Care System (2015), http://assets.ce.columbia.edu/p
df/actu/actu-uk.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5GM-LMZY]; REBECCA K. TUNSTALL, BROOKINGS
INST., AMERICANS AND BRITONS: KEY POPULATION DATA FROM THE LAST THREE U.S. AND
U.K. CENSUSES (2005), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20050208_
tunstallsurvey.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y36T-4JSN].
72. See supra notes 7, 9 and accompanying text.
73. See NABIHAH MAQBOOL ET AL., CTR. FOR HOUS. POLICY, THE IMPACTS OF
AFFORDABLE HOUSING ON HEALTH: A RESEARCH SUMMARY 2 (2015), https://www.rupco.
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As an alternative to absorbing some or all of the excessive rent
burden, some households may decide to double up and share housing expenses. While this tactic reduces a household’s housing expenditure, it does not necessarily reduce a household’s housing cost
to no more than thirty percent of income.74 At the same time, it
may impose other difficulties on overcrowded residents. For example, overcrowding may lead to increased stress and feelings of helplessness for all residents, behavioral problems for children, and increased exposure to infectious diseases.75
All of these effects impose costs on society, either directly
through medical costs, often incurred by emergency room visits, or
indirectly through absenteeism at the workplace or suboptimum
production when present.76 Many studies have found that the provision of affordable housing can reduce these costs.77 Living in
overcrowded conditions also creates a significant educational deficit on children. I will discuss this later issue further in Part C.
3. Housing Insecurity
The term “housing insecurity” covers a wide variety of housing
problems, some of which were discussed in previous parts.78 In this
org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/The-Impacts-of-Affordable-Housing-on-Health-CenterforHous
ingPolicy-Maqbool.etal.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZC2H-R5ZH] (“Families paying excessive
amounts of their income for housing often have insufficient resources remaining for other
essential needs, including food, medical insurance, and health care.”).
74. Id. at 2.
75. Id. at 7.
76. Id. at 2 (“[A]dults living in unaffordable housing are more likely to describe themselves as being in fair or poor health compared to similar individuals living in affordable
housing. Cost burdened adults are also more likely to report failure to fill a prescription or
adhere to health care treatments as a result of cost.”).
77. See, e.g., Lauren Taylor, Housing and Health: An Overview of the Literature,
HEALTH AFFAIRS (June 7, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20180313.
396577/full/ [https://perma.cc/SXY2-WELY] (“[P]roviding access to stable housing can improve health and reduce health care costs. Within a population of nearly 10,000 people in
Oregon with unstable housing, the provision of affordable housing decreased Medicaid expenditures by 12 percent. At the same time, use of outpatient primary care increased by 20
percent and emergency department use declined by 18 percent for this group.”).
78. See, e.g., Robynn Cox et al., Measuring Population Estimates of Housing Insecurity
in the United States: A Comprehensive Approach 1 (Dec. 2017) (unpublished working paper)
(on file with Washington Center for Equitable Growth), https://equitablegrowth.org/wp-cont
ent/uploads/2017/12/12192017-WP-measuring-housing-insecurity.pdf [https://perma.cc/LM
4F-AKVS].
To better describe and understand the condition of housing for U.S. households, Cox et al. (2017) propose a new definition of housing security to unify
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part, I will focus primarily on the loss of, or significant threat of
losing, a home. Some commentators have referred to this situation
as “pre-homelessness.”79 The result of housing insecurity is often a
move, and in some cases, many moves, by a household within a
short period of time. In other cases the insecurity manifests itself
as psychological pressure and, occasionally, physical illness due to
the constant threat of losing their home.
A study of more than 22,000 low-income families, interviewed
across five urban medical centers between 2009 and 2015, found
that thirty-four percent had been either homeless, behind in rent,
or had made multiple moves (with eighty-six percent experiencing
only one of these conditions).80 In the families reporting at least
one adverse housing condition, as compared with families with a
stable housing situation, the health results showed: a significant
percentage of caregivers suffered from depression; children suffered from lifetime hospitalizations and fair and/or poor child
health; and households suffered from material hardships.81 One
commentator points out that:
Children without stable housing were more likely to use emergency
department services as a result of a lack of a regular health care provider. Children under three years who had moved two or more times
in the previous year were found to have lower weight for their age . . .

Id.

past concepts and develop a comprehensive measure that captures the multiple
dimensions of housing. The new definition for housing security is the ‘Availability of and access to stable, safe, adequate, and affordable housing and neighborhoods regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation’ . . . For
housing, the above inclusive definition improves upon prior conceptualizations
by capturing multiple facets of being housed. The new definition presents housing insecurity as a continuum of housing-related issues among seven dimensions—housing stability, housing affordability, housing quality, housing
safety, neighborhood safety, neighborhood quality, and homelessness—with
homelessness being the most severe form of housing insecurity.

79. See BROOKE SPELLMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., COSTS
ASSOCIATED WITH FIRST-TIME HOMELESSNESS FOR FAMILIES AND INDIVIDUALS A-14 (2010),
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/pdf/Costs_Homeless.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7
ZR-HXE9] (“Mainstream service costs were analyzed for the periods before, during and after
homelessness. The pre-homelessness period was defined as the 12 months prior to the first
homeless program entry for an individual in the study cohort. During homelessness was
defined as the period between a cohort member’s initial entry into a homeless program and
his or her final exit from a homeless program. The after homelessness period was defined
as the period between a person’s final program exit date and the end of the study period . .
. .”).
80. Megan Sandel et al., Unstable Housing and Caregiver and Child Health in Renter
Families, 141 PEDIATRICS 1, 7 (2018).
81. Id. at 4.
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and they were at greater risk of developmental problems. Among adolescents, a significant association was found between early use of illicit drugs and moving four or more times before the age of sixteen
years.82

The authors go on to highlight what is an obvious but often overlooked advantage of having a stable housing situation: greater access to social services and health care.83 Each of the effects of housing instability mentioned in this part result in costs, directly or
indirectly to the economy through government expenditures for the
cost of health care, lost productivity on the job, and lost horizons
for many children saddled with the result of the insecurity.
C. Educational Losses
The discussion in the previous part concerning the effect of inadequate, unaffordable, and unstable housing on the health of children has an additional dimension. There is also a demonstrated
effect on the educational attainment of children exposed to these
housing risks.84 Much of the effect is as a result of health related
problems, both physical and emotional.85 Some of this effect is due
to absence from school due to illness or injury.86 Much of the effect
is due to other factors: stress derived from parents; stress derived
from too frequent moves; and the absence, or disruption, of strong
relationships and networks.87
For children in school, moving is often detrimental. Studies suggest that children who move, particularly those who move frequently, suffer declines in educational achievement.88 The educational consequence of these effects is not limited to the student
82.
83.
84.
85.

MAQBOOL ET AL., supra note 73, at 3.
Id. at 5.
MACARTHUR FOUND., supra note 64, at 7–8.
See MAYA BRENNAN ET AL., CTR. FOR HOUS. POLICY, THE IMPACTS OF AFFORDABLE
HOUSING ON EDUCATION: A RESEARCH SUMMARY 7 (2014), https://www.nhc.org/wp-content
/uploads/2017/03/The-Impacts-of-Affordable-Housing-on-Education-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZQ6H-EAPE]; Rebekah Coley et al., Relations Between Housing Characteristics and the
Well-Being of Low-Income Children and Adolescents, 49 DEV. PSYCHOL. 1775, 1776, 1785
(2013).
86. See BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 85, at 7.
87. See MACARTHUR FOUND., supra note 64, at 4. “Housing instability leads to truancy,
and moving three or more times between third and sixth grade decreases students’ test
scores by 20 points, on average. . . . [C]hronic parent stress in poor living conditions has
severe negative impacts on children’s ability to adjust socially.” Id.
88. See BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 85, at 2–3. The authors point out, as I mentioned
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suffering from housing instability. The “churn in the classroom has
been shown to impact not only the students facing homelessness,
but their peers, as well.”89 What has society lost when a student’s
opportunity to be educated is compromised? What contributions
might have been made that will not be due to the insecurity, economic or qualitative, of that student’s housing situation? These
costs are certainly more opaque than the direct health care costs
but they are real and, one might imagine, significant.
D. Productivity
Once again, there is a significant overlap between losses in employment related productivity and health; and, once again, the casual observer is likely to miss much of the nuance associated with
this loss. What we see is the absenteeism of workers that derives
from illness, physical or psychological, or injury.90 Much of this
problem can be attributed to inadequate or unaffordable housing.91
What is less apparent is the loss that occurs when employees, while
on the job, function at less than an optimal level due to illness or
injury.92 Even less amenable to precise calculation is the loss to
in Part II.B.2, that some households move to access a better school or neighborhood even
though it results in a cost burden. The effects mentioned here are often less severe or even
nonexistent for those families. Id.
89. MACARTHUR FOUND., supra note 64, at 8.
90. See MAYO CLINIC HEALTH SOLS., THE TRUE COST OF POOR HEALTH 1 (2008), http://
www.mywellbeingjourney.com/PDF/Marketing/Mayo-True_Cost_of_Poor_Health.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NT3Q-SS2T].
91. See MAQBOOL ET AL., supra note 73, at 4–7.
92. See, e.g., MAYO CLINIC HEALTH SOLS., supra note 90, at 1 (discussing the business
costs of poor health).
[M]any organizations currently don’t pay enough attention to the hidden costs
of avoidable sick days and presenteeism—the cost of employees who are on the
job but not fully functioning because of real illnesses and medical conditions,
including asthma, seasonal allergies, arthritis, migraines, depression, back
pain, gastrointestinal disorders and diabetes.
Depression costs U.S. employers more than $35 billion a year in reduced performance at work. On-the-job pain (including back pain, headaches and arthritis) costs employers nearly $47 billion a year in productivity loss. In one study,
chronic conditions alone were estimated to cost The Dow Chemical Company
more than $100 million annually in lost productivity for its U.S. work force—
the equivalent of 6.8 percent of total lab costs for the company in 2002. One
research team calculated the total cost of presenteeism in the United States to
be greater than $150 billion per year.
Id.
Of course, not all of these costs are associated with poor or unaffordable housing (although
some of them surely are), but the numbers provide an idea of the magnitude of the cost of
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society and its workforce when health related issues deprive young
people of an adequate education and job training.
While it is very difficult to quantify these losses, (although it is
clear that they are very large) and difficult to verify a causal link
to inadequate or unaffordable housing, it is more than plausible to
consider a portion of the losses to be caused by the lack of such
housing. It is also plausible to consider the losses due to inadequate
training and poor health to be ongoing until the underlying problem is solved. Society, directly, through actual expenditures, and
indirectly, through productivity and opportunity losses, bears
these costs.
III. GOVERNMENT AND MARKET FAILURE
If it is the case that the lack of affordable housing imposes significant costs on society, one might ask why society has not rectified this problem. One answer could be that society is not fully
aware of the magnitude of the costs. Alternatively, the costs may
be recognized but are not as large as the costs of remedying the
problem. Both of these answers are conceivable, but with the level
of research that has been done, policy makers and professionals
are presumably aware that there are hidden costs associated with
the lack of a sufficient number of decent, affordable housing units.
While the total of all the costs has not been calculated, the nature
of the costs is surely understood, thus suggesting a response to the
former rationale: society is aware of the costs.
The latter problem, the relative level of costs, is more difficult—
both because the total amount of the costs imposed and their causal
connection to housing is contestable. For the purpose of the remainder of this discussion, I will assume the costs imposed are
large, but without attempting to quantify them, and that large

poor health in one sector of society. See also Bruce Japsen, U.S. Workforce Illness Costs
$576B Annually from Sick Days to Workers Compensation, FORBES (Sept. 12, 2012, 8:02
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2012/09/12/u-s-workforce-illness-costs-576b
-annually-from-sick-days-to-workers-compensation/ [https://perma.cc/GJ47-LRU6] (“The
Integrated Benefits Institute, which represents major U.S. employers and business coalitions, says poor health costs the U.S. economy $576 billion a year, according to new research.
Of that amount, 39 percent, or $227 billion is from ‘lost productivity’ from employee absenteeism due to illness or what researchers called ‘presenteeism,’ when employees report to
work but illness keeps them from performing at their best.”).
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costs are attributable, to some significant extent, to the lack of adequate, affordable housing for low-income residents. Once again, I
will leave out of this discussion, although I believe it is crucial to
include in any national debate, the question of society’s obligation
to provide for, at least, the basic needs of its members. Given these
parameters, I would like to discuss two theories that might explain
society’s pursuing a more costly path than it needs to. The first of
these theories is the collective action problem highlighted by Mancur Olson. The second involves the theory of public choice, brought
to the attention of the public largely through the work of James
Buchanon.
A. Collective Action
Mancur Olson examined the behaviors of theoretically rational
members of a group seeking some common good.93 His theory involves the problem of collective behavior.94 Assume the existence
of a large group, such that no single member’s contribution to the
group (or, for that matter, withdrawal from the group’s effort) will
be noticed (or missed) and assume further that the benefit, once
achieved, will be available to all members, regardless of whether
they contributed to obtaining the benefit.95 Olson’s view is that rational members of the group will not make the contribution necessary to achieve the benefit assuming that they will receive it for
free once it is achieved.96 Of course all members of the group will
make the same calculation with the result that no one will make a
contribution and the benefit will not be obtained by anyone.97 He
continues:
When there is no pre-existing organization of a group, and when the
direct resource costs of a collective good it wants are more than any
single individual could profitably bear, additional costs must be incurred to obtain an agreement about how the burden will be shared
and to coordinate . . . the effort to obtain the collective good.98

93. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 1–2 (1971).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 15–16.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 16.
98. Id. at 47.
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Olson’s theory has some resonance concerning the problem of affordable housing. First, for the vast majority of those in our hypothetical rational society, there is relatively minor benefit from the
provision of more affordable units. For them, the benefit would be
some share of the societal cost savings achieved by reducing and
eliminating some of the costs of the negative externalities associated with the lack of affordable units. The bulk of the benefits
would, of course, go to the poor who would obtain better, more affordable units along with the positive externalities that come with
them. Others, however, would bear the initial costs of providing
the additional units.
But here we confront one of Olson’s major concerns. There is no
adequately large organization currently in place to advocate for the
provision of housing and no person or organization who could affect
the economic landscape by providing a sufficient number of units.
Who is likely to bear the costs of organizing such a group and who
is likely to contribute to it when each person’s share of the resulting benefit would be infinitesimally small, if recognized at all? Certainly, the market is not an answer. The market has failed to provide the units which, in classical economic theory, makes sense.
Rational developers of units do not see a return commensurate
with their costs sufficient to induce them to develop units for lowincome residents. The only player capable of influencing the market, by financial incentives or by compulsion, is the government.
That, of course, connects collective action theory to public choice
and brings us to the question of why government has not created
sufficient incentive or sufficient compulsion to have such units
built. It is questions such as these that the public choice theory
attempts to answer.99

99. It is important to note here that there are critics of Olson’s theory. One such critic,
Gunnar Trumball, has pointed out that while Olson and others have argued that concentrated and narrow interest groups dominated political action, “diffuse interests have historically nearly always found representation in public policy. Across the advanced democracies,
diffuse groups like retirees, patients, and consumers enjoy strong protections—protections
that were opposed by industry.” GUNNAR TRUMBALL, STRENGTH IN NUMBERS: THE
POLITICAL POWER OF WEAK INTERESTS 1 (Harvard Univ. Press 2012).
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B. Public Choice
It seems to be nothing more than simple and obvious wisdom to
compare social institutions as they might be expected to actually operate, rather than to compare romantic models of how such institutions might be hoped to operate.100

Basically, public choice is a theory that attempts to apply economic principles to political institutions and actors.101 The traditional public choice theory posited that political participants, voters, candidates, legislators, and officials, all were “rational, utility
maximizers.”102 Thus, political actors would be expected to maximize their own utility when faced with decisionmaking situations
and, more subtly, to manipulate agendas such that their utility is
likely to be maximized.103 For individual voters, one might expect
votes in favor of their own interests.
This position is complicated by several constraints. First, each
voter typically has a number of issues that might enhance his or
her utility. Candidates might be split on supporting these issues
such that no single candidate would support all of a voter’s preferences. Moreover, within a candidate’s constituency, blocs of voters
will differ on particular issues while the blocs themselves are quite
fluid such that someone who agreed with bloc A on a particular
issue might disagree with bloc A on another issue.
How, then, should a candidate respond to this level of indeterminacy? Economic theory, including Buchanan’s unromantic candidate, would expect the candidate to take positions that would
maximize the candidate’s own utility, that is, to get elected. Therefore the candidate will engage in a calculation as to which combination of positions will garner him or her the most votes. This is
likely to be true regardless of what the candidate’s personal view
is as to the issues in question. Unless the candidate feels very
strongly about one or more particular issues, his or her personal
feelings about an issue are likely to offer less utility than his or her
desire to get elected (or, as we shall see, reelected).

100. Buchanan, supra note 51, at 12.
101. See id. at 12–13.
102. Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice: A Survey, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE–II,
supra note 51, at 23, 23.
103. See Buchanan, supra note 51, at 19.
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The elected official has similar motivations to those of the candidate. If he or she wants to be re-elected and to remain in power,
he or she will take actions best calculated to maximize that utility.
Again, this is typically without regard to how the official feels personally about the issue in question. However, more and more we
see that ideology plays some role in how candidates and officials
present themselves and how they decide issues. Therefore, one
might consider that ideology is a significant component in how a
candidate or an official maximizes the utility of being elected or reelected.
C. The Political Economy of Affordable Housing
Housing is a significant component of human existence for everyone.104 It is also a political issue with particular import for lowincome residents. But the political issue has, for the most part,
been neglected by society. While candidates for public office and
policy makers occasionally point out the nature of the affordable
housing problem, they rarely follow through on a significant level.
This should not be very surprising.
1. Neutral Rationality
On the surface, there is almost no economic incentive for the private market to engage in developing affordable housing. While
there are several mission driven private developers, primarily nonprofits,105 that engage in such development, and there are a few
federal programs106 and programs in some state and local jurisdictions107 that subsidize both non-profit and for-profit developers to

104. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and
Urban Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 527 (2007) (“Housing provides a necessary foundation for physical and social life. It provides shelter, security, recreation, and wealth. It plays a central role in the health and well-being of its occupants and
also supports their employment and educational endeavors.”).
105. Two that operate in the District of Columbia are the National Housing Trust and
the Community Preservation and Development Corporation. See Impact, NAT’L HOUSING
TR., https://www.nationalhousingtrust.org/impact [https://perma.cc/7GGM-DYT6] (last visited Feb. 1, 2019); What We Do, COMMUNITY PRESERVATION & DEV. CORP., https://www.cp
dc.org/about-us/what-we-do/ [https://perma.cc/2N3T-2XEB] (last visited Feb. 1, 2019).
106. See, e.g., Low-Income Housing Credit, 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2012 & Supp. V 2018).
107. See, e.g., Housing Production Trust Fund, D.C. CODE § 42-2802 (2019).
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build affordable units, the magnitude of affordable housing development is nowhere near the need and the gap of available affordable units grows by the year. Therefore, the only actor who is able
to fund the development of massive amounts of units is the federal
government.108
But the various individuals and institutions responsible for developing policy at the federal level do not have a constituency that
would motivate them to pursue an affordable housing agenda. A
part of the reason for this is that low-income people, the primary
beneficiaries of more affordable housing, vote less frequently than
higher income individuals.109 And, of course, they do not have the
funds to mount a lobbying campaign likely to produce the number
of affordable units that are needed. Moreover, those with the funds
for lobbying do not typically have affordable housing as a high priority on their political agendas. But, perhaps they should.
If it is true that there is a cost associated with the absence of
affordable units, one would expect that an economically rational
society would correct for that defect. The fact that the problem has
not been corrected suggest several responses. The first, of course is
that the cost of correction exceeds the benefit derived from a correction; that is, that society has made the economically rational
choice. The second is that benefits exceed costs and society has
made an irrational decision which might be susceptible to correction. A third option is that there is another utility function in play
which might be an antipathy, conscious or unconscious toward the
poor or people of color. Such a hypothesis would bring us full circle
to the beginning of this essay recognizing the fiftieth anniversary
of the FHA.

108. State governments are much less able to make a significant impact on the problem.
Each is faced with a collective action problem; that is, each will receive some benefit from
the development of affordable housing but each also calculates that if they build the units,
low-income residents from other jurisdictions will absorb some of the units while if they let
other states build the housing, the state can free-ride on that effort and have some of its
low-income residents relocate to other states.
109. See, e.g., Sam Fulwood III, Why Young, Minority, and Low-Income Citizens Don’t
Vote, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 6, 2014, 10:37 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/is
sues/race/news/2014/11/06/100627/why-young-minority-and-low-income-citizens-dont-vote/
[https://perma.cc/72T8-BXRG].
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2. Power, Agendas, and the Conflict of Competing Goods
I have written a good deal on questions of power and powerlessness in society and argued that power is much more subtle than
the use or threatened use of force.110 Some commentators have argued that the ability to set an agenda and determine what is
brought to the public for debate is the essence of power.111 Others
have argued that power is the ability to shape the desires and beliefs of the society.112 These theories make it conceivable that the
reluctance of many to invest in affordable housing, despite the possibility of personal (albeit indirect) benefit from doing so, is the result of a long-established cultural norm concerning the “undeserving” nature of the poor and people of color. There is value to some
to perpetuate an underclass. Perhaps even more importantly,
there may be value to some to have conflict and competition between races and among lower-income groups. Thus, the ability to
inculcate a series of cultural norms and to set the agenda of public
discourse enhances the benefits to be derived by those with such a
set of utilities, those with power.
Even without a theory of issue suppression and agenda setting
by the powerful, there is a significant obstacle to the mobilization
of an affordable housing movement. While housing is a central issue for many, it is not the only central issue. Health care, education, or national defense, among other issues, may all have a high
priority among well-meaning, rational utility maximizers. This
problem was identified by Kenneth Arrow, who theorized that
when a large group of voters must choose among more than two
possible outcomes, there is no democratic voting system that can
produce a reasonable prioritization of preferences.113 Voters asked
to create a priority order of their choices will continually “cycle” the

110. See, e.g., Michael Diamond, Community Economic Development: A Reflection on
Community, Power and the Law, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 151 (2004); Michael Diamond, Community Economic Development and the Paradox of Power, 1 IRISH REV.
COMMUNITY ECON. DEV. L. & POL’Y 5 (2012); Michael Diamond, The Transposition Of Power:
Law, Lawyers, and Social Movements, 24 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 319 (2017).
111. See Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 947, 947–48, 952 (1962).
112. Steven Lukes, Introduction to POWER 1, 10 (Steven Lukes ed., 1986) (“[P]ower may
operate to shape and modify desires and beliefs in a manner contrary to people’s interests.”).
113. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 1–6 (1951). Arrow’s
hypothesis is often called Arrow’s theorem or the “impossibility theorem.” Id.
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choices without coming up with an acceptable array.114 I have also
written about the problem of multiple competing options. In doing
so, I have examined the question of how a society ought to make
choices when faced with competing options that most in the society
would consider social goods and where there are finite resources
such that all of the goods cannot be realized.115 The answer is far
from clear. Arrow would say that in a democracy, there is no possible solution to the problem of ordering fairly the preferences of
multiple parties. I am a bit more optimistic.
CONCLUSION
Housing is a fundamental building block for a well-functioning
civil society. It affects all aspects of human existence and interaction. Because the market has failed to provide decent affordable
housing for low-income households, the government is the only institution that can fill the void and, I believe, it has a moral obligation to do so. This essay, though, makes an additional argument.
It examines the costs to society of fulfilling its moral obligation to
provide affordable housing and suggests that the true cost of accomplishing this goal is considerably less than is popularly believed. Providing additional affordable units may even result in a
net savings to society.
The creation and operation of housing, though, is an expensive
undertaking which, without subsidy, cannot be supported by the
financial contributions of low-income individuals. Society may,
however, have the means of providing that subsidy through its own
investment in housing and through the resulting savings from a
reduction of externalized costs. More empirical research is needed
to quantify the costs and savings but, once that is done, we, as a
society, will have another major data point to consider in addressing the social choices we need to make. This process, however, does
not address the political/economic problem of public choice, or the
issue of conflicting social goods. Resolving those problems is grist
for another essay.

114. See Michael Morreau, Arrow’s Theorem, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 13, 2014),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arrows-theorem/ [https://perma.cc/KPR8-82TQ] (giving a
brief explanation of Arrow’s theory).
115. Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing and the Conflict of Competing Goods: A Policy Dilemma, in AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 12, 12 (Nestor
M. Davidson & Robin Paul Malloy eds., Routledge 2016) (2009).

